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‘‘A Fifth Freedom’’ or ‘‘Hideous Atheistic
Expediency’’? The Medical Community and
Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960–1975
GAYLE DAVIS and ROGER DAVIDSON*
Introduction
The purpose of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill, published on 15 June 1966,
was to amend and clarify the law relating to termination of pregnancy by a registered
medical practitioner. When David Steel, a young Liberal MP from the Scottish Borders,
put this bill forward, some suggested that a Scottish politician had no need to introduce
abortion reform since Scots law was already satisfactory in this regard. Certainly, abortion
law in Scotland was more flexible than its English counterpart, and the number of pro-
secutions few. The line between criminal and non-criminal abortion was, however, just as
indistinct, with great medical uncertainty in this area. On becoming law, the 1967 Abortion
Act was the first piece of abortion-related legislation to cover Scotland, England andWales
collectively.1 None the less, for a variety of legal and moral reasons, abortion policy and
practice continued to differ on either side of the Border.
The sexual politics surrounding abortion law reform has, in recent years, attracted
increasing attention from historians, sociologists and political scientists. Several broad
strands of interpretation may be detected within the literature. Early writing on the
history of abortion and the 1967 Abortion Act generally subscribed to an ‘‘heroic’’ inter-
pretation of events. It was largely produced by abortion law reform activists and sym-
pathizers to stress the significant advantages accruing from an end to surreptitious and
expensive criminal abortions, and to praise the importance of the Abortion Law Reform
Association (hereafter ALRA) within the process of legal reform.2 Thereafter, a range
of more nuanced approaches have been advanced. For example, historians of sexuality
have interpreted abortion law reform as part of a whole raft of legislation in the
1960s, including homosexual law reform and the revision of divorce law, which
redefined the relationship of the State and the law to the moral domain of the private
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citizen.3 Other commentators have focused on the political manoeuvring surrounding the
1967 Abortion Act, often as a case study in the role of pressure groups in shaping sexual
politics.4 In addition, a body of literature has investigated the role of the medical profession
within abortion law reform, and the degree to which the law has influenced, and been
interpreted within, medical practice.5 In particular, feminist analysis, some drawing heav-
ily upon the work of Foucault, has been brought to bear on the implications of the
‘‘medicalization’’ of abortion law reform for the reproductive rights of women.6 Such
writing tends to exhibit pronounced ambivalence towards the medical monopoly of
abortion provision through the 1967 act.7 In many respects, this literature feeds into
other areas of research centring on the impact and penetration of biomedical perspectives
within individual, social and political life.8
However, while the history of abortion policy and provision in Britain has received
extensive attention by scholars, such studies have mainly centred on the social politics
surrounding the issue at Whitehall and Westminster. There have been no substantial
corresponding studies of Scotland to date, despite the fact that, to a significant extent,
Scotland possessed its own system of law, local government and medical practice, as well
as arguably a distinctive civic and sexual culture. In the case of abortion law reform this is
particularly surprising given that the 1967 act was to be substantially modelled on the
Scottish experience.
Using a range of legal, medical and governmental files, supplemented by oral testimony,
this article seeks in part to rectify these omissions by examining such regional differences
as they informed abortion law reform. First, it surveys abortion law as it existed in Scotland
prior to the 1967 act, contrasting it with English statute law and law enforcement on the
subject. Secondly, the article examines Scottish medical practice relating to abortion
before the 1967 act, highlighting the work of the gynaecologist, Dugald Baird, and the
influence of his liberal ideology and clinical practice in Aberdeen at a time when uncer-
tainty and misunderstanding of abortion law prevailed elsewhere in Scotland. Thirdly, it
explores the input of Scottish medicine to the politics surrounding the 1967 act, focusing on
the two key medical figures of Dugald Baird and Ian Donald. Residual doubts over the
3See, for example, Hera Cook, The long sexual
revolution: English women, sex, and contraception
1800–1975, Oxford University Press, 2004; L A Hall,
Sex, gender and social change in Britain since
1880, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000; J Weeks, Sex,
politics and society: the regulation of sexuality since
1800, 2nd ed., London, Longman, 1989.
4See, for example, M Durham, Sex and politics:
the family and morality in the Thatcher years,
Basingstoke, Macmillan Education, 1991; B Brookes,
Abortion in England, 1900–1967, London, Croom
Helm, 1988; L J F Smith, ‘The abortion controversy,
1936–77: a case study in ‘‘emergence of law’’’, PhD
thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1980.
5See, for example, J Keown, Abortion, doctors
and the law: some aspects of the legal regulation of
abortion in England from 1803 to 1982, Cambridge
University Press, 1988; S MacIntyre, ‘The medical
profession and the 1967 Abortion Act in Britain’, Soc.
Sci. & Med., 1973, 7: 121–34.
6See, especially, L Hoggart, Feminist campaigns
for birth control and abortion rights in Britain,
Lewiston and Lampeter, Edwin Mellen Press, 2003;
M Latham, Regulating reproduction: a century of
conflict in Britain and France, Manchester and
New York, Manchester University Press, 2002;
S Sheldon, Beyond control: medical power and
abortion law, London, Pluto Press, 1997.
7As Sheldon sums up: ‘‘Medicalisation has been
the greatest strength of the British abortion law and its
greatest weakness. It has simultaneously depoliticised
the extension of women’s access to abortion
services, defused political conflict and left women
dependent on the vagaries of medical discretion and
good will’’. See Ibid., p. 168.
8For an historiographical introduction to the
concept of ‘‘medicalization’’, see R Nye, ‘The
evolution of the concept of medicalization in the late
twentieth century’, J. Hist. Behav. Sci., 2003, 39:
115–29.
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inclusion of Scotland in abortion legislation and continuing anomalies between English
and Scots Law after the passing of the act are then discussed. Finally, the impact of
the act north of the Border is charted using Scottish evidence to the Lane Committee
(1971–74), and an evaluation made of how far abortion procedures were in fact medica-
lized in the following decade.
The article concludes by characterizing the attitude of the Scottish medical community
to abortion in the 1960s as one of ‘‘reluctant medicalization’’, an attitude which current
historiography has generally failed to take account of when critiquing the process of
‘‘medicalization’’. Many Scottish doctors, and even more Scottish nurses, strongly ques-
tioned intervention in this field both in terms of ethics and propriety. Moreover, whereas
the conventional historiography largely stereotypes the response of the medical community
towards abortion, this article will suggest the need for a more nuanced approach which
captures the diversity and ambiguities that characterized themedical community’s response
to the ‘‘medicalization’’—or enforced medical monopoly—of abortion at this time.
Scottish Abortion Law before 1967
Prior to the 1967 Abortion Act, English abortion legislation dated from Section 58 of the
Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, which made the procurement of a miscarriage a
crime. This was subsequently modified by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, which
exempted those cases where abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother, and by
a 1938 judicial ruling—the Bourne case—which interpreted the 1929 act as permitting
abortion where the woman’s mental health was at risk. North of the Border, however,
abortion law followed a somewhat different course. Neither of the aforementioned acts
applied, nor did the Bourne case. In Scotland, abortion was a common law offence without
strictly defined limits. Thus, it was possible to interpret it more elastically than English
statute law. Scottish legal textbooks recorded that abortion was illegal but that it could be
legally carried out when certain medical criteria relating to the life and health of the mother
were satisfied.9 In short, it was possible for a medical practitioner, acting in good faith in
the interests of the health or welfare of his patient, to terminate a pregnancy after a careful
study of all the circumstances of the case, and after due consultation with appropriate
medical specialists. Thus, abortion was only a crime in Scotland if criminal intent could be
proved, a doctor having freedom to practise medicine in this type of case, as in all others,
according to his clinical judgement.
As well as separate legislation, there were peculiarities in abortion law enforcement. In
English law, due to the terms of the 1861 Offences against the Person Act, an individual
other than the mother might be guilty of the offence whether the woman ‘‘be or be not with
child’’.10 The crime here was not the abortion itself but the doing of an act with intent to
procure abortion; the doing of an act not requiring a victim before it could be held unlawful.
In contrast, north of the Border, conviction for attempted abortion could be obtained only
if it was proved that the woman was actually pregnant, the reason for the necessity of
9See, for example, G Gordon, The criminal
law of Scotland, Edinburgh, W Green & Son,
1967.
10Wellcome Library, Archives and Manuscripts
(hereafter Wellcome), SA/ALR/C.119, R Ireland,
‘Scottish section of the historical and international
appendix’ (undated).
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pregnancy being that abortion was ‘‘held to be criminal because its successful accom-
plishment result[ed] in the destruction of potential human life’’.11 The victim of the crime
of abortion or attempted abortion in Scots lawwas the potential child, so that if there was no
potential child there was no crime.12
Furthermore, the high standard of proof called for in Scottish criminal prosecutions
made it difficult to obtain sufficient evidence for a prosecution for illegal abortion, since
the operator, pregnant woman and her family would usually have a joint interest in
concealment. A doctor who carried out an abortion in Scotland could not be charged
with any crime unless a definite complaint was made. Even then the matter would be
investigated by doctors nominated by the Crown Office, and if they were satisfied that the
operation had been carried out in good faith and in a proper manner the case would be
closed. Such investigations and decisions took place in private within this centralized
system, the press and public knowing nothing of them. By contrast, in England, all such
matters were brought before either a magistrate’s court to decide whether there was a prima
facie case, or a coroner’s court in the case of death from the operation. Moreover, in
England, a prosecution could be instituted by any of the innumerable local police forces—
who might differ in their policies—even if all proper professional procedures had been
followed and there were clear medical grounds for the termination. A police investigation
of this kind, conducted in the hospital with an interrogation of the medical men concerned,
could seriously disrupt the hospital environment.13
In July 1966, the Secretary of State for Scotland was asked whether any prosecution had
been instituted against a registered medical practitioner in Scotland since 1945 for procur-
ing an abortion where the defence had argued that the abortion was in the interests of the
life or health of the mother. William Ross replied that enquiries had not revealed a single
case of this description.14 Although a trawl of Scottish High Court records for the decades
before 1966 does reveal a number of cases for the crime of procuring abortion, prosecutions
were usually in cases where an ‘‘amateur’’ person was making a trade of abortion for
private gain, or where there had been a risk to health by use of improper methods, with a
medical element usually lacking.
The story of a highly unusual case in 1967, when Dr Roderick Sutherland Ross, a general
practitioner, was tried at the High Court in Edinburgh on two charges of procuring abor-
tion, merely serves to reinforce this picture.15 The principal distinguishing feature of this
high-profile case was the fact that the defendant was medically qualified; his counsel,
Mr A Bell, QC, describing the case as ‘‘unique in these courts’’ since his client was the first
doctor in modern times to stand before a Scottish court on such charges. This doctor,
Bell continued, was ‘‘no fumbling, unqualified, back-street quack’’, but a qualified, skilled
and experienced medical practitioner who had built up a large practice, both private and
National Health, in the previous nineteen years. In both cases, it was claimed, the girls had
11K McKnorrie, ‘Abortion in Great Britain: one
act, two laws’, Criminal Law Review, 1985: 475–88,
p. 483.
12This was founded on a ruling by a single judge in
Glasgow (HMAdvocate vAnderson, 1928), proceeding
on the assertion that ‘‘to attempt to dowhat is physically
impossible can never . . . be a crime’’. The ruling was
approved by three High Court judges in 1937, the law
thereafter being regarded as settled.
13Observer, 6 Feb. 1966.
14National Archives of Scotland (hereafter NAS),
AD63/759/1, House of Commons question, 19 July
1966.
15NAS, JC26/1967/117, High Court of Edinburgh
trial papers, 24 Jan. 1967.
32
Gayle Davis and Roger Davidson
come to Ross in a state of ‘‘complete agitation and desperation’’. The doctor had consulted
a professional colleague before proceeding, and the operation had been a success, with no
unfortunate sequellae.16
In response, the Crown Agent stated: ‘‘The main point is surely that Ross pled Guilty to
criminal abortion. Obviously had the operations he performed been on, or even near the
borderline, between the criminal and the necessary or therapeutic, he would never have
pled guilty, and might very well never have been charged’’.17 Ross was stated to have been
‘‘well known among the young of Edinburgh’’ as an abortionist, offering to perform the
procedure for £100. It was alleged that, with little or no preliminary examination, other than
to confirm the fact and duration of pregnancy, Ross simply gave these girls the injections
‘‘very much after the manner of the back street abortionist’’, sent them home, and told them
that if anything cropped up they should get in touchwith him. According to the Prosecution,
it was ‘‘inherent in the whole argument . . . that the girls aborted when at home with no one
there to give any kind of medical advice or help’’. These injections were given, not in a
clinical setting, but in a ‘‘little bedsitting room acquired by the accused ostensibly for
bagpipe practice’’.18 Everything was thus said to point to these having been nothing but
commercial abortions rather than being performed in good faith for therapeutic reasons. As
such, the Court found Ross guilty and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. Yet, the
fact that this legal case provoked such a storm of controversy and media coverage was
precisely because its medical element was so exceptional in Scots law.
Dugald Baird and the Practice of Abortion
A key but, as we shall see, somewhat atypical medical figure in the history of Scottish
abortion practice and law reform, was Sir Dugald Baird (1899–1986). Born in Greenock
and educated in Glasgow, Baird spent several years in junior hospital positions in Glasgow
before working as a gynaecology registrar at Glasgow Royal Infirmary under the renowned
Munro Kerr. It was in Glasgow during the Depression that Baird grew to recognize the
various influences that social and economic factors could have upon maternal health and
women’s physiology. He was shocked by the high maternal mortality amongst mothers due
primarily to the effect of excessive childbearing, to the lack of advice on family planning,
and to the lack of access to abortion.19 Baird’s experience in the city would lead to his long-
lasting involvement with social research into reproductive health.
In 1936, Baird was appointed to the Regius Chair of Midwifery at the University of
Aberdeen. On arrival in 1937, he found social conditions very similar to those prevailing in
Glasgow.20 However, he accepted the Aberdeen appointment for various reasons, above all
believing the city to be ideal for the research he considered necessary to establish the
factors needed for efficient childbearing.21 The city was of appropriate size for epidemio-
16NAS, HH41/1820, John Hobson, MP, to Bruce
Millan, Scottish Office, 20 Feb. 1967.
17NAS, AD63/759/2, Note by Crown Agent,
Feb. 1967. It is unclear from the legal records why
Ross pleaded guilty.
18 Ibid.
19Wellcome, SA/ALR/C.115, Note by Sir Dugald
Baird (undated).
20Although Glasgow was much the larger of the
two, both cities were plagued by poverty and severe
employment and housing shortages at this time.
21S MacIntyre and L MacAulay (eds), Thirty years
and still going strong: papers presented at the 30th
anniversary of the MRC Medical Sociology Unit,
University of Glasgow, Occasional Paper no.1, MRC
Medical Sociology Unit, Glasgow, 1996, p. 1.
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logical research, the settled population enabling the effective follow-up of women and their
families, and the centralized medical service facilitating studies of a total population.22
The Medical Officer of Health during the 1950s and 1960s—Dr Ian MacQueen—was also
instrumental in helping Baird to construct his maternal care policies for the city, and
ensured the backing of local health authorities; while Baird’s wife, May, was a councillor
who became Chairman of the Health Board.23 Finally, the Aberdonian community exhib-
ited ‘‘liberal’’ political attitudes and religious diversity in the post-war era, providing an
accepting environment for Baird’s policies. As such, Aberdeen was able to offer financial,
medical and popular support to Baird.
Baird took advantage of these circumstances to implement the sort of system he could not
have obtained in Glasgow. Abortion was a notoriously unpopular procedure among Glas-
wegian doctors, due primarily to the relatively high proportion of Roman Catholics there,
whereasBaird felt it to be a reliablemedical practice applicable inmany different situations.
He was aware of the tenuous legal standing of abortion when he arrived in Aberdeen.
Indeed, in the late 1930s he sought the advice of Thomas Smith, Professor of Law at the
University, for clarification on the issue. According toBaird, Smith explained that therewas
little likelihood of the Lord Advocate or Procurator-fiscal initiating prosecutions against
Baird for terminating a pregnancy unless theywere convinced of ‘‘criminal intent’’.24Given
such assurances, Baird and his colleagues subsequently adopted an active policy of ther-
apeutic abortion, recognizing ‘‘social’’ indications,25 and terminating about two out of
every hundred pregnancies in the Aberdeen area long before abortion practice had been
liberalized in any other part of Scotland, and decades before the 1967 act.26 Moreover, this
was with the full support of the local police. As Chief Constable William Smith of the
AberdeenCity Police explained: ‘‘What we are concerned about is the procuring of abortion
with criminal intention.We have no connectionwithwhat the doctors do in the hospitals’’.27
Not only was Baird’s clinical practice unusual at this time. He was also unusual for his
willingness to publicize this work and to become increasingly involved in the politics
surrounding abortion. During the 1960s, Baird began to dedicate himself to helping
women achieve what he referred to in his classic lecture as a ‘‘Fifth Freedom’’—‘‘freedom
from the tyranny of excessive fertility’’.28 This lecture heralded a more politicized Baird,
22Baird later reflected that, in the largest area
of Scotland—the western—the organization of
maternity services was complicated by the many large
obstetric hospitals; whereas the north-east and
eastern regions had only one main teaching hospital
each, which had many advantages, such as a common
administrative policy, and agreement on methods of
investigation and treatment. See D Baird, ‘An area
maternity service’, Lancet, 1969, i: 515–19, p. 516.
23The ultimate combination of Chairman of the
Board and Professor of Obstetrics was a powerful one,
adding greatly to Baird’s power to influence policy and
appointments.
24G Bhatia, ‘Social obstetrics, maternal health care
policies and reproductive rights: the role of Dugald
Baird in Great Britain, 1937–65’, MPhil thesis,
University of Oxford, 1996, p. 59.
25However, it should be noted that HughMcLaren,
who was Baird’s first registrar in Aberdeen, and
who subsequently became a leading critic of abortion
as Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology in
Birmingham, later questioned the extent to which
social abortions had been conducted in Aberdeen prior
to the Second World War. See Scotsman, 22 Dec.
1966.
26Hindell and Simms, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 54.
However, most patients were married women of high
parity, worn down by years of childbearing.
Terminations in unmarried women were still rare at
this time, and abortion ‘‘on request’’ viewed as
unacceptable.
27Turiff and District Advertiser, 11 Feb. 1966.
28D Baird, ‘A fifth freedom?’, Br. med. J., 1965, ii:
1141–8, p. 1141.
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who began explicitly to discuss female rights within reproductive medicine. Through free
and effective contraception and abortion provision, women could achieve autonomy over
their bodies, as well as having the satisfaction, alongside men, of becoming educated ‘‘to
their maximum potential ability’’ and having ‘‘the opportunity to exercise their skills in a
wider sphere than the immediate family’’.29
Baird’s stance should be contextualized within Scottish medicine at this time. When the
Liberal MP, David Steel, introduced his Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill in 1966,
many observers considered that the measure was superfluous given the state of existing
Scottish abortion law. Certainly, the number of prosecutions for abortion in Scotland was
minimal—only twenty in the previous five years, of which hardly any involved a doctor.
Yet the line between criminal and non-criminal abortion was just as indistinct as in
England. Although in north-east Scotland, gynaecologists like Baird had for many
years been terminating pregnancies in good faith, and without fear of prosecution, in
other areas of the country the legal right to terminate pregnancy was not being utilized,
nor were the differences between English and Scots law in this regard made clear to
medical students.30 As a result, graduates generally believed that procuring an abortion
was a crime unless the woman’s life was in imminent danger.
Aberdeen was thus one of the few cities in Scotland to exploit the ambiguities of the law
relating to abortion. Equally, while Baird trained a generation of gynaecologists—includ-
ing Malcolm Macnaughton, David Paintin, Alexander Turnbull and James Walker—who
were to command the heights of obstetrics in Britain, and uphold Aberdeen’s liberal
policies, Baird himself remained until the mid-1960s an exception within the ranks of
Scottish medicine. Elsewhere in Scotland, gynaecologists remained wary of terminating
pregnancies except in cases of pronounced ‘‘medical’’ need.31 In fact, Baird felt a sense of
frustration that the law had to be changed at all, and that his fellow doctors were not
following his lead, explaining:
What I have done is to act as a spearhead for those who are not so strongly placed. A Scottish
professor has considerable status and the security which that brings . . . One hears talk about
modernising the abortion laws. Certainly the law should be clarified and spelt out in words of one
syllable. But the work has been done for 20 years, it has all been documented, and I haven’t gone
outside the law.32
Scottish Medical Input to the 1966 Bill
The thalidomide tragedies of the early 1960s are generally believed to have contributed
to the climate of public and medical sympathy for women seeking abortion. Soon after the
29 Ibid., p. 1148.
30However, this is not surprising, given that
textbooks such as J Glaister and E Rentoul, Medical
jurisprudence and toxicology—the ‘‘medico-legal
bible’’ for generations of doctors in Scotland—failed to
differentiate England and Scotland in this regard. See
12th ed., Edinburgh and London, E & S Livingstone,
1966, pp. 363–6.
31Oral testimony suggests that indications
other than of an emergency medical nature were
little used, most doctors believing social and
psychological grounds to be illegal. Transcripts of a
series of interviews with retired general practitioners,
gynaecologists and psychiatrists, Apr. 2003 to
Apr. 2004, are held by Gayle Davis. These were
granted on condition of anonymity and confidentiality
and are not available for consultation.
32Observer, 30 Jan. 1966.
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publicizing of British cases, a Daily Mail national opinion poll showed 73 per cent of
the British public to be in favour of abortion where a child might be born deformed.33
While publicity surrounding this tragedy undoubtedly generated sympathy for the idea of
permitting abortion in certain circumstances, a number of abortion bills presented in
Parliament during the 1960s met with failure. However, there was a rising tide of public
opinion, which the ALRAwas helping to orchestrate by publicity and the political lobbying
of MPs and parliamentary candidates.34 It was in this way that David Steel became
involved in the abortion issue. After consultation with the ALRA, and having recently
read Alice Jenkins’ Law for the rich,35 he found himself ‘‘convinced that this was a
substantial issue, well worth doing’’,36 and introduced his Private Members’ Bill on
the issue, having come third in the ballot.
During 1966, Steel was subjected to advice and pressure from many sources whilst
drafting the bill—from the ALRA, religious groups, and government ministers, among
others. However, it was a doctor who was to prove one of the most important influences on
Steel. Dugald Baird was not only busy implementing an active abortion programme in
Aberdeen but also taking an active interest in policy-making at the national level. He began
to meet with politicians and publicly supported both the NHS provision of contraception
and abortion law reform in his writings and lectures. In November 1966, Baird, together
with Malcolm Millar, Professor of Mental Health in Aberdeen, lunched with Steel in
Scotland. Baird was interested in incorporating some kind of ‘‘social’’ clause into the
bill but also urged the MP not to separate social from medical factors as he did not view
such a separation as good medical practice.37 Steel himself recognized the importance of
this discussion, later claiming: ‘‘I was greatly influenced by . . .Baird, who persuaded me to
accept amendments creating a single socio-medical clause rather than a series of indivi-
dual categories’’.38
Pressure groups also made use of Baird. To promote the passage of the bill and to
counteract anti-abortionist writings, the ALRA publicized the support of such medical
practitioners. Baird was also asked to persuade other gynaecologists to deliver statements
to the local and national press in order to ‘‘counteract [negative] publicity’’ engendered by
opponents of reform.39 He responded generously to the ALRA’s requests, making himself
visible at fertility control forums and writing to newspapers and medical periodicals in
33Daily Mail, 25 July 1962.
34The ALRA was the most notable of the women’s
campaign groups involved in this issue. In 1936, this
group of articulate middle-class women, active in
sex reform and socialist politics, was formed to
bring women in from the periphery of the abortion
discussion. See Brookes, op. cit., note 4 above.
35A Jenkins, Law for the rich, London, Victor
Gollancz, 1960, highlighted the social inequalities
that existed in abortion practice with regard to both
income and geography.
36M D Kandiah and G Staerck (eds), The Abortion
Act, 1967, London, Institute of Contemporary British
History, 2002, p. 25. Abortion was not Steel’s first
choice. The ‘‘touchy’’ subjects of homosexual and
abortion law reform were suggested to him, for both
of which private members’ bills had already been
passed in theHouse of Lords and awaited a champion in
the Commons. Steel plumped for abortion because
Scottish opinion was seen to be adamantly opposed to
homosexual law reform. See T Newburn, Permission
and regulation: law and morals in post-war Britain,
London, Routledge, 1992, p. 142; R Davidson and
G Davis, ‘‘‘A field for private members’’: the
Wolfenden Committee and Scottish homosexual law
reform, 1950–1967’, Twentieth Century Br. Hist.,
2004, 15: 174–201.
37Kandiah and Staerck (eds), op. cit., note 36
above, p. 47.
38D Steel, Against Goliath: David Steel’s
story, London, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1989,
p. 53.
39Wellcome, SA/ALR/A.6/1, V Houghton to
D Baird, 4 Nov. 1966.
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justification of his actions. Baird further recognized that it was important to involve the
new generation of medical practitioners, especially consultants, in the campaign. In private
correspondence to the ALRA, Baird explained that it would be politically constructive for
‘‘younger men, like [Baird’s successor, Professor Ian] MacGillivray, [to] come out into the
open on the matter’’. He felt that it could easily be put about that his views were ‘‘very
exceptional in clinical circles’’ or that he was ‘‘senile’’.40 In addition, the ability of the
ALRA to cite Aberdeen as an example of a city with a successful, active abortion policy
was significant for the political campaign.
Glasgow provides a very fitting comparison with Aberdeen in this regard, for it lay at the
other extreme in terms of Scottish abortion provision. Glasgow had the lowest abortion rate
of any Scottish city, due, according to Baird, partly to the existence of a large Roman
Catholic minority, but more so to the anti-abortion views of several of its leading
obstetricians.41 As with Aberdeen, an individual seems to have exerted considerable
influence within the obstetrical community. Ian Donald (1910–87) was born in Cornwall,
and educated in Scotland and South Africa. Service in the RAF stimulated his interest in
gadgetry, where he became familiar with radar and sonar, an expertise he was later to apply
to medical diagnostics by developing obstetric ultrasound.42 In 1954, Donald moved to
Glasgow to accept the Regius Chair of Midwifery. An active member of the Scottish
Episcopal Church, he was to become a committed opponent of termination of pregnancy
for social reasons, a leading campaigner against the 1967 Abortion Act, and Dugald Baird’s
most outspoken critic. Throughout his career, Donald refused to terminate a pregnancy
unless the foetus was grossly deformed or the mother’s life in serious danger, seeing even
therapeutic abortion—that is, termination of pregnancy for medical reasons—as ‘‘funda-
mentally destructive’’.43 He considered issues such as inadequate housing, financial debt,
and marital breakdown as inadequate reasons for ‘‘killing a baby’’, pointing to the ‘‘huge
social services’’ available to help people to cope in such circumstances.44 Baird’s ‘‘Fifth
Freedom’’ was dismissed as a ‘‘doctrine of hideous atheistic expediency’’.45 Instead,
Donald discussed abortion within the context of the holocaust, likening abortion for
social reasons to the Nazi campaign of ‘‘destroying the socially unacceptable Jews’’.46
In practical terms, Donald claimed that one pregnancy in fifty was terminated in Aberdeen,
compared to one in 3,750 in Glasgow.47
Donald employed his new ultrasound technology as a powerful anti-abortion resource.
In Glasgow’s Queen Mother Maternity Hospital, oral testimony suggests that Donald
would show ultrasound images to women seeking an abortion in a deliberate attempt
to deter them from their chosen course of action.48 At public meetings, he used a similar
40Wellcome, SA/ALR/A.6/1, D Baird to
V Houghton, 8 Nov. 1966.
41D Baird, ‘Induced abortion: epidemiological
aspects’, J. Med. Ethics, 1975, 1: 122–6, p. 124.
42During the Second World War, echoes from
high-frequency sound waves were used to detect
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clinicians and engineers who modified this
technology to provide clinically useful images and
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43 I Donald, ‘Abortion and the obstetrician’,
Lancet, 1971, i: 1233.
44Scottish Daily Record, 1 Feb. 1967.
45Scotsman, 31 Dec. 1966.
46Scotsman, 26 Dec. 1966.
47Scotsman, 23 Dec. 1966.
48This was at a time when ultrasound was not
used routinely in the management of pregnancy. These
scans were, it seems, specially organized to persuade
women to continue with their pregnancies. See
MNicolson, ‘IanDonald—diagnostician andmoralist’,
pp. 1–26, pp. 21–2 (section 4). http://www.rcpe.ac.uk/
library/history/donald/donald1.php.
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technique, showing slides of premature babies accompanied by tape recordings of the
beating heart of a six-week foetus, as a powerful accompaniment to his anti-abortion
speech.49 As he explained, ‘‘there was a popular idea that in early pregnancy there was
a sort of inanimate jelly which could be scooped out’’, whereas ultrasound revealed the
foetus at twenty-eight days to be ‘‘recognizable, with head, eyes, fingers and toes’’.50
Through its depiction of the foetus’s characteristics, ultrasound arguably endowed the
foetus with an identifiable individuality.51
Donald’s ideology did not feed into policy debates as Baird’s did, but his views were
widely exploited by the Catholic Church and anti-abortion organizations in the later 1960s
and beyond. In fact, mirroring Baird’s involvement with the ALRA, Donald became a
founder member of the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (hereafter SPUC),
set up in January 1967 in opposition to Steel’s bill and the ALRA. This voluntary orga-
nization was to prove one of the leading anti-abortion forces, Steel admitting retrospec-
tively that the SPUC could be ‘‘a real menace’’, particularly in view of the involvement of
several major medical figures with its activities.52 However, the SPUC lacked the political
skill and well-placed connections of the ALRA, and arguably was formed too late to have a
significant impact on the immediate campaign surrounding the 1967 act. Rather, its role
was to sustain in the longer term a more protracted struggle to reverse the impact of the act
on access to abortion.
Glasgow and Aberdeen provide a stark contrast in terms of the abortion ideology of their
main obstetricians. As Sally MacIntyre discusses, the 1967 act raised an issue increasingly
facing medicine and society; namely the boundary of the profession’s sphere of compe-
tence and authority.53 During the passage of Steel’s bill in the Commons, one group argued
for the sanctity of life and the doctor’s duty to preserve it; while another argued that the
doctor’s prime duty was to the health of his patient. On the former side were doctors like
Donald, whose philosophy was based on the argument that, if destroying the foetus for any
other reason than immediate danger to the woman’s life were to be permitted, the profes-
sion would utilize its expertise to destroy life in other situations. Donald summarized this
argument in referring to abortion as: ‘‘the thin end of the wedge that leads to Belsen,
euthanasia of the old, infirm and imbecile, and a brave new 1984 world of test tube babies
in artificial wombs’’.54 Those who took the latter view tended to focus on the mother,
arguing that they were being true to their vocation by preventing ill-health. According to
Baird and MacGillivray in Aberdeen, in considering abortion, the well-being of the mother
was the prime factor. The preservation of life at all costs was, they argued, ‘‘surely not the
point’’. Rather, they believed that doctors should be concerned with ‘‘the relief of human
49Wellcome, SA/ALR/H.58, Note on a Public
Meeting, 6 Dec. 1966.
50The Times, 12 Jan. 1967.
51New reproductive technologies have
subsequently been used more widely to strengthen
pro-life arguments. The pseudo-scientific film,
The silent scream, became the piece de re´sistance of
this genre. See Sheldon, op. cit., note 6 above,
pp. 151–2. See, also, P Treichler, L Cartwright
and C Penley (eds), The visible woman: imaging
technologies, gender, and science, New York and
London, New York University Press, 1998, chs. 5
and 6; R Petchesky, ‘Foetal images: the power of
visual culture in the politics of reproduction’, in
M Stanworth (ed.), Reproductive technologies:
gender, motherhood and medicine, Cambridge,
Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1987,
pp. 57–80.
52Kandiah and Staerck (eds), op. cit., note 36
above, p. 42. In this sense, both pressure groups were in
agreement, finding that it was medical rhetoric which
had the greatest potential in fighting their cause.
53MacIntyre, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 121.
54Daily Sketch, 12 Jan. 1967.
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suffering’’.55 Those supporting Steel’s bill thereby espoused a broader concept of health
and, by extension, of their own functions and expertise.
Although Baird and Donald reveal the sheer diversity of medical responses to the
suggested medicalization of termination of pregnancy, their highly visible involvement
in the politics of abortion was, in fact, extremely unusual within Scottish medicine at this
time. Few individuals were willing to stand up and be counted as these menwere.While the
major London-based medical bodies, in particular the British Medical Association (here-
after BMA) and Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (hereafter RCOG) did
play a significant part in shaping the 1967 act, neither the Scottish Council of the BMA nor
the Scottish Standing Committee of the RCOG articulated a specifically Scottish view
on the issue. Although Scottish medical opinion was said to ‘‘embrace all shades of
attitude’’,56 such evidence as is available would suggest that much of the medical com-
munity and the majority of practitioners were broadly opposed to the bill, either on ethical
or professional grounds. For example, the Scottish Council of the Royal College of Mid-
wives registered firm opposition to the bill on ethical grounds.57 The attitude of general
practitioners is more difficult to identify, but appears also to have been hostile. For
example, one family doctor likened abortion to ‘‘euthanasia and possibly even murder’’.58
He doubted whether nurses and medical students could be ‘‘injected properly with the
principles of medicine’’ if they saw one doctor saving life and another taking it away at the
will of prospective parents. On somewhat different grounds, another doctor aired his
concerns to the Secretary of State for Scotland that the bill would enable abortion to
be obtained on demand by any woman, leaving the doctor in no position to refuse her
request.59 This concern over the impact of the act on professional autonomy, and the widely
held view that existing abortion law in Scotland was perfectly satisfactory, were also
echoed in the correspondence of an Edinburgh gynaecologist to the Scotsman.60
Such ethical and professional concerns reflected the two key issues engaging public and
professional debate over abortion law reform in the United Kingdom: the issue of how far
abortion should be controlled solely by medical practitioners, and the issue of how far
‘‘social’’ criteria might appropriately be considered. On the issue of eliminating compet-
ing medical services by unqualified persons, or so-called ‘‘kitchen table’’ abortions,61
Baird and Donald were in fact in agreement. Although in general Baird preferred the law to
‘‘interfere as little as possible with clinical practice’’, he did recognize that ‘‘one [had] to
legislate for the unscrupulous, especially where large fees [were] possible’’.62 Similarly,
Donald supported legislation to retain medical control of abortion and to exclude the
55MacIntyre, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 125.
56NAS, HH41/1820, D Cowperthwaite to
J Hogarth, SHHD, 28 Nov. 1966.
57 ‘Abortion law reform Bill’, Midwives Chron.,
1967, 80: 69–70, p. 70. This is in contrast to the UK
Royal College of Nursing, which refused to
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58Scotsman, 31 Dec. 1966.
59NAS, HH41/1820, A Orcharton, Ayrshire,
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3 May 1967.
60Scotsman, 23 Dec. 1966.
61Glasgow Herald, 2 Mar. 1966. Indeed, the
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‘‘racketeer who has brought such discredit upon our profession’’.63 It seems likely that such
views, underpinned by a strong Scottish tradition of professional autonomy in this area,
strongly influenced David Steel in his drafting of the bill. Thus, he opted, subject to certain
administrative formalities, to give doctors complete control in the decision-making process
surrounding abortion.
On the issue relating to the desirability of social criteria for abortion, it is Baird’s views
that seem to have had a decisive influence. While the ALRA felt strongly that the bill
should contain a ‘‘social clause’’ allowing abortion after rape, when a patient was under
sixteen, or lacked the capacity to be a mother, David Steel was acutely aware of the
opposition of the medical establishment to such a clause, which in the view of the
BMA and RCOG required doctors to sanction and perform a medical operation on
non-medical grounds, outside their realm of expertise.64 To try to pacify medical opposi-
tion, Steel duly amended his bill in December 1966. On advice from Baird, he deliberately
widened the definition of ‘‘social’’, dropping the words ‘‘serious’’ (risk to life) and ‘‘grave’’
(injury to health), and instead adopting the idea of the mother’s ‘‘well being’’ and that of
her existing children.65 As a result, in line with Baird’s long-standing belief that social
factors were inseparable from medical considerations, the act subsequently buried the
social clause in the general grounds for termination.
Attempts to Exclude Scotland
According to a senior official of the Scottish Home and Health Department (hereafter
SHHD), there was still, in 1966, considerable doubt in the minds of Scottish politicians
and administrators over the desirability of Scotland’s inclusion in the Medical Termination
of Pregnancy Bill.66 While acknowledging that the existing law of abortion in Scotland
was ‘‘difficult to defend in theory’’, the Lord Advocate’s Department was persuaded that
there was ‘‘no specific demand’’ for reform of Scots law in this area.67 Similarly, the
Secretary of State for Scotland, William Ross, observed that: ‘‘I am bound to say that
I personally would have preferred that it did not apply to Scotland, where the law has
not given rise to the difficulties in England and Wales which seem to motivate the
sponsors’’.68
A range of objections—some general, some more specific—were advanced. First, it
was feared that if the grounds for termination were to be further restricted during the
Committee stage of the bill—for example, if family circumstances could not be taken into
consideration—powers under the existing law in Scotland might ultimately be reduced.69
This was part of a more general concern within the Scottish political and medical establish-
ment that clinical flexibility, hitherto permissible under Scots law, must be maintained.
Secondly, the Scottish Office questioned the wisdom of applying ‘‘uniform standards’’
throughout the country, whether it be Orkney or Harley Street, given the wide variation in
63Donald, op. cit., note 43 above, p. 1233.
64See Hindell and Simms, op. cit., note 2 above,
pp. 166–76.
65See file NAS, AD63/759/13.
66NAS, AD63/759/1, Note by D Cowperthwaite,
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67 Ibid.
68NAS, HH41/1820, W Ross to A Orcharton,
12 June 1967.
69NAS, HH41/1821, D Cowperthwaite to
J Brennan, 10 Aug. 1967. Cowperthwaite wished
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medical facilities and the comparatively small number of registered nursing homes in
Scotland.70 Since in Scotland very few abortions were performed outside NHS facilities,
the problem of policing private clinics was not viewed with the same urgency as in
England. Another issue involved the appropriateness of a doctor being required to decide
whether rape had been committed prior to an abortion procedure, given that such a decision
was normally the outcome of High Court proceedings in Scotland.71 A similar difficulty
surrounded the issue of conscientious objection, where doctors were involved in civil
proceedings as a result of refusing treatment on grounds of conscience.72 The Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Bill placed the onus of proof solely on the conscientious
objector, whereas under Scots law, corroborative evidence was required.73 As a result,
the bill was amended to allow for variance between the two legal systems on this issue.
However, in the event, Dugald Baird was to play a vital role in persuading David Steel to
include Scotland in his bill. According to Steel, Baird told him: ‘‘Whatever you do, don’t
let them drop Scotland out of the bill on the spurious grounds that it is easier under the
common law; it is easier under the common law, but I am the only person doing it’’.74 Steel
had quickly realized that the situation in Aberdeen was very different from that in Glasgow,
Edinburgh and the other medical centres in Scotland, and that consequently there was a
need to apply legislation north of the Border.75 Accordingly, he successfully orchestrated
opposition to a series of amendments threatening to delete Scotland from the bill.
Continuing Regional Variations
The provisions of the 1967 Abortion Act came into operation from 27 April 1968. It
made termination legal where the risk to the life of a pregnant woman, or of injury to her
physical or mental health, or to that of her existing children, was greater than the risks from
abortion, or where there was a substantial risk that a baby would be seriously handicapped.
Two doctors were required to certify that the indications for abortion existed, except in
cases of medical emergency, where one was deemed sufficient; and the operation was only
to be performed in an NHS hospital or another officially approved location. No doctor was
obliged to administer such treatment if he or she had a conscientious objection, except
in cases of emergency.
Given that the 1967 act was to apply to England, Wales and Scotland collectively, one
might assume that the law of abortion, for all practical purposes, became the same through-
out mainland Britain. Certainly, most of the rules laid down in the act were of equal
applicability to all three countries. The medical opinions to be obtained, the places where
induced abortions might be carried out, and the circumstances in which an induced abortion
70NAS, HH41/1820, W Robertson to
M MacDonald, 2 Mar. 1967.
71Glasgow Herald, 3 June 1967.
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was legal, were identical in all jurisdictions. However, in practice, there still remained
significant legal anomalies. Indeed, D Cowperthwaite, Assistant Secretary of the SHHD,
protested at the ‘‘quite unnecessary Scottish presentational and political difficulties
because of the unwillingness of English departments and draftsmen to budge from drafts
which [met] English needs on purely English considerations but cause[d] difficulty for the
Scots’’.76
The most significant of these anomalies was the time limit. As the time limit in Steel’s
bill was based upon the provisions of the 1929 Infant Life (Preservation) Act, in effect it set
a limit of twenty-eight weeks for abortions. However, as the 1929 act was not applicable to
Scotland, in theory at least, the 1967 act could be interpreted much more liberally north of
the Border, so as to allow terminations up to the moment of birth, so long as two
medical practitioners certified in good faith that certain conditions were satisfied. A second
important anomaly related to the different criteria for abortion as specified on medical
documentation in England and Scotland. David Steel objected to the classification ‘‘non-
medical’’ used on the English form as, in his view, admitting a distinct and separate
‘‘social’’ category of reasons, which his legislation had consciously tried to avoid.77
The Scottish form differed in this respect, deliberately employing instead the term
‘‘medico-social’’ in order to avoid such a distinction, and to encapsulate ‘‘the spirit of
a medical judgement in a social context’’.78
Generally speaking, the Abortion Act arguably made little difference to the freedom
already existing in Scotland, apart from the requirement to notify all terminations of
pregnancy to the Chief Medical Officer of the SHHD and to register nursing homes
carrying out such operations. In fact, as Medical News reported, ‘‘The new Abortion
Act [was] largely ignored by many Scottish doctors, who [had] been practising abortion
under their own Common Law for years’’.79 Similarly, as the Crown Office subsequently
claimed, while English law had been brought ‘‘more or less into line with the practice in
Scotland’’, in theory, Scottish practice had been, if anything, restricted by the new law.80
Evidence to the Lane Committee
Criticism of the way the 1967 act was working began almost as soon as the legislation
came into force. On the basis of considerable parliamentary and other pressure for an
enquiry, the Secretary of State for Social Services, Sir Keith Joseph, announced in 1970
the Government’s decision to appoint a committee to review the operation of the act.81
The SHHD was invited to participate in giving evidence to this enquiry. However,
Scottish policy-makers were initially dubious about the need for this investigation
to cover Scotland; the general feeling being that the act was working satisfactorily.82
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In particular, the fact that the issue of private abortion clinics was far ‘‘less acute’’ north of
the Border served to reinforce this feeling.83 However, on balance, it was felt that it was
advisable for any enquiry to cover the whole of Great Britain, with the SHHD prepared to
go along with any legislative changes proposed for the sake of ‘‘uniformity in the law rather
than any current clamant problem in Scotland’’.84
Under the chairmanship of Justice Elizabeth Lane, the fifteen-member Committee on
the Working of the Abortion Act (Lane Committee) was assembled, consisting of senior
members of the medical, legal and nursing professions, and leading representatives from
the fields of social science, education and welfare.85 The Committee began to take evi-
dence from a variety of organizations and private individuals in August 1971, asking them
to submit their criticisms of the act and suggestions for improvement.86 The Committee
sat for two-and-a-half years before publishing its three-volume report in April 1974, in
which it suggested a variety of administrative measures to tighten the regulations and
improve the act’s effectiveness, including regulation of abortion in the private sector,
improved counselling of patients, the prevention of pregnancy and abortion through
education and contraception, and the lowering of the upper limit for termination from
twenty-eight weeks to twenty-four. However, most significantly, the Committee unex-
pectedly and unanimously expressed confidence in the act and its provisions.87
Scottish evidence submitted to the Committee and reaction to the final report reveals
that the dichotomy in medical opinion on abortion, epitomized by Baird and Donald prior
to the act, was still very much in evidence. As Professor E McGirr, Dean of the Faculty of
Medicine at the University of Glasgow, observed:
There is a wide spectrum of opinion on the subject amongst medical teachers. It varies from the
view that the implied assumption of the utter disposability of life must entitle the Report to the
distinction of being one of the most pagan in British parliamentary history to full agreement with
the views expressed by the Committee.88
In general, the report was well received by those Scottish medical bodies to
which it was circulated. The Royal College of Physicians, Edinburgh, commented that
the recommendations were almost entirely consistent with their own submission to the
Lane Committee, while for the Borders Health Board it was ‘‘a most excellent account
of the situation’’.89 However, not all were so positive. Borders Health Board’s Nursing
and Midwifery Advisory Committee recorded that their own discussions ‘‘quite often
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led [them] back to the question as to whether or not the Abortion Act should ever have been
introduced’’.90 Meanwhile, Redlands Hospital for Women wished to put across ‘‘the state
of bafflement tinged with resentment felt by many of the older gynaecologists when faced
with the working of what was not a very well thought-out Act’’.91
English critics of the act focused particularly on three issues: the role of the private
sector, access by foreign women to British abortion services, and the advertising of British
abortion services abroad;92 none of which were crucial issues in Scotland. However, there
were areas of joint concern, expressed by the Scottish medical community in both their
evidence to the Committee and their responses to the final report. These included, in
particular, the pressure on gynaecological services imposed by abortion work, the impact
on staff resourcing of the conscience clause and of professional differences over the
appropriateness of abortion procedures within normal maternity care, geographical varia-
tions in the interpretation of the act, and issues surrounding the statutory time limit for
terminations.
A leitmotiv of the Scottish evidence was the impact of the rising number of abortions on
existing hospital facilities. The Scottish Association of Executive Councils deplored the
fact that the act had led to an increase in the waiting list for normal gynaecological
operations, taking the view ‘‘that if a choice ha[d] to be made between more terminations
and a reduction in the gynaecological waiting list they would unreservedly choose the
latter’’.93 Nursing staff voiced similar concerns. For example, the Matron of Bellshill
Maternity Hospital complained that:
this problem has been foisted upon us without the necessary resources of space, theatre time and
personnel to deal with it. . . . [O]ur commitments to our ordinary patients are barely met, standards
of nursing care are falling, and yet we have to spread our professional skills still further to cope
with this additional category of patient.94
While several leading gynaecologists, including Ian MacGillivray, stressed the need for
termination procedures to be largely under medical control,95 there were other groups
of medical staff—particularly nurses and midwives—who considered that it was entirely
inappropriate for such cases to be dealt with within an ordinary obstetric setting.96 As the
Principal Nursing Officer for the Aberdeen Special Hospitals reported, there was a ‘‘gen-
eral feeling that a maternity hospital [was] not the best place for a termination of preg-
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nancy, and that midwifery staff whose interests [lay] in the care of mothers and babies, and
who [chose] to work in a maternity hospital, [did] not expect to be involved in this type of
work’’.97 Similarly, in the experience of one Matron, nurses—not all of whom had
religious affiliations—‘‘frankly resent[ed] the use of their skills and their professional
time in this way, particularly as many of them [did] not feel that they [met] their commit-
ments to the patients for whom they [felt] they owe[d] a nursing duty’’.98 Indeed, there
was considerable evidence that the issue in some institutions was seriously impairing the
relationship between doctors and nursing staff.99
Moreover, the issue of ‘‘conscience’’ also had implications for recruitment, especially of
Catholic doctors. Some witnesses registered their concern that the act might be deterring
‘‘good young doctors from entering the specialty of gynaecology’’, particularly as their
career development might be damaged if they refused to perform terminations.100 Clearly,
the need to balance the right of the individual doctor to conscientious objection with the
broader obligation within the NHS to provide an abortion service proved highly proble-
matic for senior clinicians seeking to staff their departments.
Geographical variations in abortion provision within Scotland was an additional concern
expressed both in the media and in evidence to the Lane Committee. The Scottish Daily
Record deplored the fact that obtaining an NHS abortion depended on where you hap-
pened to live, as revealed quite clearly by SHHD statistics.101 It was claimed that a female
resident in North-East Scotland was more than twice as likely to get an abortion as a woman
living in theWest; Glasgow having ‘‘diehard pro and anti-abortion forces . . . battling it out
in the various theatres of war’’. In Edinburgh, abortions ‘‘seem[ed] to be left pretty much to
the consciences of individual doctors’’. Meanwhile, in Dundee, it was estimated that more
than 700 abortions were being carried out yearly, the highest rate per head of population in
Scotland.102 As one of the city’s senior gynaecologists observed: ‘‘It has reached the stage
where we carry out abortions almost on request. Though we don’t shout it from the
rooftops’’. Elsewhere, Aberdeen was said to be ‘‘still among the leaders’’, although
only women living in the hospitals’ catchment areas were considered. Thus, as the Scottish
Daily Record concluded: ‘‘The working of the Abortion Act [was] a giant lottery and if
your number [came] up you [could] thank lady luck for the privilege’’.103 Due partly to this
geographical inequality, significant numbers of women normally resident in Scotland were
reported to be obtaining abortions in England and Wales—the vast majority in non-NHS
premises. To place this in context, from 1972, about 7,500 abortions were carried out each
year in Scotland, while as many as 1,000 women travelled south for an abortion.104 In fact,
the Glasgow-Liverpool train was nicknamed ‘‘the Abortion Express’’, in recognition of this
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traffic south by women forced to pay for the operation because a free NHS abortion had
been denied them.105
Similar evidence was presented to the Lane Committee. The Scottish General Medical
Services Committee claimed that facilities for termination were ‘‘sporadic and unevenly
distributed throughout the country, due to the individual attitude of some doctors’’.106 As the
Scottish Association of Executive Councils noted: ‘‘Variation in the application of the Act
. . . sometimes result[ed] in ‘shopping around’ to find a gynaecologist whose interpretation
of the criteria [was] liberal and who [was] prepared to agree to termination of a preg-
nancy’’.107 Indeed, the Board ofManagement for Glasgow Royal Infirmary made clear that
it was this very ‘‘shopping around’’ that was responsible for their greatly increased gynae-
cological waiting list.108 However, in response, the SHHD commented that, although they
were ‘‘fully aware that the individual attitudes of some obstetricians and gynaecologists in
certain areas to abortion may have tended to create an unevenness of service in Scotland’’,
the decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy was ‘‘a medical one and the Depart-
ment would not wish to interfere with the judgment of any doctor’’.109 Thus the pre-1967
pattern persisted, with policy-makers deflecting responsibility onto the medical profession,
which continued to interpret policy according to individual clinical judgements.
Finally, there was the question of the appropriate time limit for termination. The Lane
Committee’s recommendation that abortion should be unlawful above twenty-four weeks
gestation received more Scottish comment than any other. The Committee’s reasoning was
said to be based mainly on the wish not to prejudice the use of diagnostic amniocentesis,
as in some circumstances the final outcome of this procedure might not be available
until the twenty-second week of gestation. The SHHD highlighted the ‘‘general feeling’’
that the existing limit of twenty-eight weeks was ‘‘probably too high nowadays in view of
the sophistication of modern support systems’’, although there were pronounced differ-
ences of opinion as to what the new lower level should be.110 The Royal College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow, along with the Lanarkshire and Borders Health
Boards, favoured the twenty-four week limit proposed, although bodies like Dumfries
and Galloway Health Board made a point of stressing that any limit should not be absolute
as obstetricians should have the right to intervene if the mother’s life was in danger.
There was, however, a very strong measure of support for an upper limit of twenty
weeks from nursing and non-medical organizations, including the Scottish Association
of Nurse Administrators, the Royal College of Midwives, and the Church of Scotland
Moral Welfare Committee. In fact, the Royal College of Midwives noted that several
bodies had expressed the opinion that abortion should not be performed after the twelfth
week of pregnancy, particularly since morbidity rates were lower at this time.111 Again,
105To a lesser extent, some women based in the
west of Scotland also visited the more ‘‘liberal’’
Scottish cities—particularly Aberdeen and
Edinburgh—when unsuccessful in obtaining a
termination in Glasgow.
106NAS, HH102/1232, Notes of Meeting between
SHHD and Representatives of the Scottish General
Medical Services Committee, 24 Sep. 1974.
107Wellcome, SA/ALR/C.27, PLC, Submission of
A W Smith, Scottish Association of Executive
Councils, 20 Dec. 1971.
108Wellcome, SA/ALR/C.35, PLC, Submission of
Board of Management for Glasgow Royal Infirmary
and Associated Hospitals, Dec. 1971.
109NAS, HH102/1232, Notes of Meeting between
SHHD and Representatives of the Scottish General
Medical Services Committee, 24 Sep. 1974.
110NAS, HH60/665, R Fraser to G Monro and
Secretary of State for Scotland, 8 Dec. 1973.
111NAS, HH102/1232, PLC, Submission of
Royal College of Midwives (Scottish Council),
30 July 1974.
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nurses and midwives were the most conservative members of the Scottish medical com-
munity submitting evidence.112
Conclusion
It is clear that, prior to 1967, abortion law in Scotland could be interpreted more flexibly
than could statutory provisions south of the Border. Thus, abortion could be legally carried
out by a medical practitioner acting in good faith in the interests of the health or welfare of
his patient. However, a review of the practice of abortion reveals that most Scottish doctors
were not in fact aware of their legal right to terminate a pregnancy, and were not taking
advantage of it. Aberdeen was the only city in Scotland systematically to exploit this
greater flexibility of Scottish abortion law, principally through the influence of the gynae-
cologist, Dugald Baird, whose pioneering abortion work in Aberdeen, and willingness to
publicize it, were to prove crucial to British abortion law reform. To an extent, there seems
to have been a curious tension between, on the one hand, the apparent progressiveness of
Scots law and local practice in Aberdeenshire, and, on the other, the very real conservatism
of opinion present more generally in Scottish medicine and civic society.
In many respects, this tension continued to inform the Scottish medical input to the
politics surrounding the 1967 act; best illustrated by the contrasting ideologies and influ-
ence of Dugald Baird and Ian Donald. Baird is seen to have been one of the most influential
figures in shaping the agenda of David Steel, promoter of the Medical Termination of
Pregnancy Bill, particularly in persuading him to create a socio-medical clause and to
disregard pressures to exclude Scotland from the bill. In addition, pro-abortion pressure
groups clearly capitalized on Baird’s medical reputation to promote abortion law reform,
highlighting the success of Aberdeen’s ‘‘positive’’ abortion policy as a template for their
campaign. By contrast, a powerful anti-abortion culture elsewhere within the Scottish
medical community, and pre-eminently in Glasgow, is seen to have been articulated by
Donald, one of Baird’s most vehement critics. His ideology and restrictive clinical practice
did not, however, feed into policy debates as Baird’s did, although subsequently his views
were to be widely exploited by both the Catholic Church and anti-abortion organizations.
Moreover, evidence suggests that the highly visible involvement of Baird and Donald in
the politics of abortion was extremely unusual within Scottish medicine at this time, with
few individual doctors willing to publicize their views, and even the Royal Colleges in
Scotland preferring to stay tight-lipped on the subject.
Furthermore, medical evidence submitted to the Lane Committee in the 1970s reveals
that, although the major English concerns were not voiced north of the Border, Scottish
medical opinion continued to exhibit pronounced ambivalence and hostility towards abor-
tion. While the Committee’s three-volume endorsement of the 1967 Abortion Act was
generally well received by Scottish medical authorities, a range of anxieties were aired
by the wider medical community of nurses and practitioners, relating in particular to the
pressures on existing gynaecological services, to the impact of the conscience clause on
112Generally speaking, this conservatism appears
to have been less apparent south of the Border where,
according to Potts, Diggory and Peel, nursing responses
to the act shadowed those of doctors, in that a few
protested bitterly but most in fact accepted or even
welcomed the legislation. See M Potts, P Diggory and
J Peel, Abortion, Cambridge University Press, 1977,
p. 310.
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staff resourcing, to professional differences over the appropriateness of abortion proce-
dures within normal maternity care, to geographical variations in the interpretation of the
act, and to the statutory time limit for terminations.
More generally, this article would suggest that the conventional historiography sur-
rounding the medicalization of abortion needs to be modified. Of all the areas of sexual
health, the history of abortion has been the one most dominated by concepts of ‘‘medi-
calization’’. Some feminist writers have been particularly critical of this process, implying
that doctors have sought to ‘‘colonize’’ women’s reproductive health.113 This article serves
in part to question that historiographical implication. Admittedly, it was largely a small
group of male doctors and politicians that shaped and defined this abortion legislation, and
in that respect, feminist criticisms remain valid. None the less, this article demonstrates
that, so far as the medical community was concerned, a diversity of views existed, with in
fact a significant degree of resistance exhibited towards the reframing of abortion as a
medical responsibility.
The attitude of the Scottish medical community to abortion in the 1960s can be charac-
terized at best as one of ‘‘reluctant medicalization’’. Dugald Baird established a bridgehead
of medical interventionism in sexual health far in advance of the main body of the medical
establishment, who continued to question the wisdom of such intervention both in terms of
medical ethics and professional propriety. Arguably, the impetus for medicalization did not
come from doctors, many of whom resisted the 1966 bill, particularly its explicit ‘‘social’’
element. Rather, it was the State that in many respects imposed medicalization, causing
noticeable resentment within the medical community. As one family doctor stated: ‘‘There
are many doubts in the minds of many doctors [as to induced abortion] and when profes-
sionals are in doubt then amateurs would do well to stand aside’’.114 Even for those
individuals embracing the terms of the bill, it could be argued that it was less about a
desire to extend patriarchal control of reproductive health than a desire to sustain profes-
sional autonomy while widening access to limited existing facilities.
By the early 1970s, the medical profession in Scotland had clearly begun to come to
terms with the provisions of the 1967 act, and there is substantial evidence of senior
consultants, in particular, stressing the need for medical control of the abortion procedure.
Yet, it is also clear that this remained largely motivated by traditional concerns over
professional status rather than any new-found ambition to dominate women’s reproductive
strategies. Moreover, a substantial body of the medical community in Scotland—particu-
larly nursing staff—continued to voice serious concerns over logistical and ethical issues
arising out of abortion; concerns that were to occupy public and professional debate for
many years to come.115
113See, for example, E Lee (ed.), Abortion law and
politics today, Basingstoke,Macmillan, 1998; Sheldon,
op. cit., note 6 above.
114Scotsman, 31 Dec. 1966.
115For an exploration of the impact of the 1967
Abortion Act on Scottish medical practice, see G Davis
and R Davidson, ‘‘‘Big white chief’’, ‘‘Pontius Pilate’’
and the ‘‘plumber’’: the impact of the 1967 Abortion
Act on the Scottish medical community, c.1967–80’,
Soc. Hist. Med., 2005, 18: 283–306.
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